Insubstantial Asides II: Schlegel on Kant
Drawn by a recent discussion on Kant over his indisputable and undiminishing influence over modern philosophy I felt the desire to register for the delectation of the assorted company a fragment from the pen of Friedrich Schlegel, a leading member of the early Romantic circle who dwelt in the immediate shadow of Kant, and parlayed with the likes of Fichte and Schelling. Furthermore, Schlegel, for the record, later became the figure of disgust for Hegel (which surely must make him something of a hero). His remarks are interesting and stimulating, even if the one I choose is perhaps merely thought-provoking rather than strictly philosophical. Beyond this I draw attention to it here because Schlegel, unlike Hegel, is witty. However, it should be at once highlighted that he is not as funny as Nietzsche, and with respect to observations on Kant, neither is he as witty: only Nietzsche could ask what has Kant really given us? with the appropriate disdain. We all know what Nietzsche has to say about that timely Konigbergian. The manner of Kant's daily constitutionals is itself surely enough of a refutation - the walk entirely regulated, never straying from his path or his allotted routine, or for that matter ever desiring a new terrain from which to appreciate an altogether different view. It is said you could set your watch by him - is it any wonder that Kant had no feeling let alone any understanding of art or that his writings breathe the air of pastoral conservatism? In sum: Kant never left Konigsberg - need we say any more?
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But let us return our thoughts to Schlegel, who throws light on the "Kantian scene" and on what for him it means to be a Kantian:
"The world considers anyone a Kantian who is interested in the latest German philosophical writings. According to the school definition, a Kantian is only someone who believes that Kant is the truth, and who, if the mail coach from Konigsberg were to ever have an accident, might very well have to go without the truth for some weeks. According to the outmoded Socratic concept of disciples being those who have independently made the spirit of the great master their own spirit, have adapted themselves to it, and, as his spiritual sons, have been named after him, there are probably only a very few Kantians." (Athenauem Fragments, 104)
The question we might ask ourselves in the light of this attempt to denominate the true path of Kantian scholarship perhaps then, in the light of the acknowledged influence of Kant on all modern Western philosophical thought, is who are these disciples? - that is say, who is properly taking up the baton that was proffered by Kant?
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But let us return our thoughts to Schlegel, who throws light on the "Kantian scene" and on what for him it means to be a Kantian:
"The world considers anyone a Kantian who is interested in the latest German philosophical writings. According to the school definition, a Kantian is only someone who believes that Kant is the truth, and who, if the mail coach from Konigsberg were to ever have an accident, might very well have to go without the truth for some weeks. According to the outmoded Socratic concept of disciples being those who have independently made the spirit of the great master their own spirit, have adapted themselves to it, and, as his spiritual sons, have been named after him, there are probably only a very few Kantians." (Athenauem Fragments, 104)
The question we might ask ourselves in the light of this attempt to denominate the true path of Kantian scholarship perhaps then, in the light of the acknowledged influence of Kant on all modern Western philosophical thought, is who are these disciples? - that is say, who is properly taking up the baton that was proffered by Kant?
posted by Scott at 9:49 pm
1 Comments:
I was interested by Scott's reference to Kant's sedentary and conservative habits. There is a very interesting piece by Deleuze ('I Have Nothing to Admit', Semiotext(e), 2.3, 1977) in which he talks about the intensities and the Ideas to which he connects through activities of thought and sensation. He argues here by way of a defence and this I think can also be construed applying to Kant as well. Deleuze talks about the pressure of the history of philosophy upon his generation and the need to invent new procedures, rules and tones to avoid being restricted by it. He achieved this and through his liberation encountered figures in the history of philosophy in new and diverse ways. He then goes on to talk about the depth of what we don't know as the basis upon which or through which we talk. Ultimately, the virtual is the most straight-forward Deleuzian tag for this depth. He talks about exteriority, connection and folding. This he does to draw out the ways in which he can have greatly challenging and significant experiences despite the fact - which is a part of the criticism he faces - that he does not travel around the world and does not engage in extreme experiences such as drug taking but does write about them. His own medical problems are irrelevant to the case he is making. He will not concede to his critic (Michel Cressole) that he talks about what he cannot understand because he isn't the actual subject who has had the private experience. He claims to have taken 'motionless trips' which he can measure only by 'emotions.' This ties into his key commitment to the connection of thought with intensities and Ideas. He is not an alcoholoic or a drug addict but he has achieved the same results by other means. He has connected with intensities through his thinking. He turns to the language of becoming, in which boundaires between subjects are overcome, and where we discover the ability to undo the human organisation of the body. He accuses Cressole of 'dull realism' and 'cautious experimentation.' This was written in 1973 after the writing of Anti-Oedipus and Deleuze had an extraodirnarily rich vocabulary with which to present, or set in context, his apparent immobility and lack of 'extreme' experience. He had gone beyond the boundaries employed by those attacking his thought. The link to Kant is, I think, that both would claim to be able to be able to connect with thoughts that exceed the limits of conventional thinking. The experiences that contribute to Kant's doctrine of the faculties are no less fundamental for being confined within habit and the region around Konigsberg. He does not wonder over the surface of the earth sipping from every flower, a dilettante never stopping to connect with anything of depth and complexity, never finding anything 'singular' in a significant sense. He had thought beyond the boundaries between the experiences of a particular subject and object through the universal and formal unities formed in the three Critiques and culminating in the Critique of Judgement. He found in time an infinite line which robbed the ego of determination and split the self in two. He threw the subject back upon Ideas in excess of anything the dilettante could find and thus put it into crisis. So many things become profound and resonating problems in Kant in a way that would be meaningless if he were always seeking extreme experiences.
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